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Abstract 
Systemic risk is a risk of collapse of the financial system that would cause the financial system is not 
functioning properly. Measurement of systemic risk in the financial institutions, especially banks are 
crucial, because banks are highly vulnerable to financial crisis. In this study, to estimate the conditional 
value-at-risk (CoVaR) used quantile regression. Samples in this study of 9 banks have total assets of 
the largest in Indonesia. Testing the correlation between VaR and ΔCoVaR in this study using 
Spearman correlation and Kendall's Tau. There are five banks that have a significant correlation 
between VaR and ΔCoVaR, meanwhile four others banks in the sample did not have a significant 
correlation. However, the correlation coefficient is below 0.50, which indicates that there is a weak 
correlation between VaR and CoVaR. 
Keywords: systemic risk, conditional value at risk, value at risk, banking industry 
 
Abstrak 
Risiko sistemik adalah risiko jatuhnya sistem keuangan yang akan menyebabkan sistem keuangan 
tidak berfungsi dengan baik. Pengukuran risiko sistemik di lembaga keuangan terutama bank sangat 
penting, karena bank sangat rentan terhadap krisis keuangan. Dalam penelitian ini, untuk 
memperkirakan nilai kondisional-risiko (CoVaR) menggunakan regresi quantile. Sampel dalam 
penelitian terhadap 9 bank ini memiliki total aset terbesar di Indonesia. Menguji korelasi antara VaR 
dan ΔCoVaR dalam penelitian ini dengan menggunakan korelasi Spearman dan Kendall's Tau. Ada 
lima bank yang memiliki korelasi signifikan antara VaR dan ΔCoVaR, sedangkan empat bank lain 
dalam sampel tersebut tidak memiliki korelasi yang signifikan. Namun, koefisien korelasi di bawah 
0,50, yang mengindikasikan bahwa terdapat korelasi yang lemah antara VaR dan CoVaR. 
Kata Kunci: risiko sistemik, conditional value at risk, value at risk, industri perbankan. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In main function, the banks collect funds from surplus units and invest to deficit 
units in the form of loans and other financial instruments. Casu, et.al (2006) defined 
the bank is an intermediary institution that bridges the gap between lender and 
borrower to perform the functions of transformation, namely transformation size, 
maturity transformation and risk transformation. As a financial intermediary, the 
banking industry may be the highest vulnerable to financial risk. The functions are 
causes of vulnerability as a result of the bank's activities. This condition causes the 
banks face the risk of maturity mismatch are vulnerable to the threat of a bank run, 
namely withdrawals massive panic caused by customer. Besides the risk of maturity 
mismatch, other lines of bank business also cause the vulnerability of banks. 
The main income of banks is difference between interest loans to creditors 
with interest given by banks to customers. But the bank also has other sources of 
income in the form of profit foreign exchange trading and securities. From this source 
of income, there is a gap that can lead to bank failures, when a decline in asset values 
as well as the increased uncertainty in the financial sector that have a negative effect on 
the activity of bank's operations. A systemic financial crisis will have an impact if many 
banks that have failed. The failure of one bank can propagate such as infectious 
diseases, causing more bank failures. If a bank failure or crisis cannot be dealt with 
swiftly, then there will be contagion effects that would trigger a systemic crisis in the 
economic system. 
Systemic risk is defined as the potential instability due to interference 
transmitted in some or all of the financial system due to the interaction of size, 
business complexity and interconnectedness between institutions and/or financial 
markets as well as the tendency of excessive behavior from the behavior/financial 
institutions to follow the economic cycle (Bank of Indonesia, 2014). Systemic risk could 
be a polemic in Indonesia when the Financial System Stability Committee poured huge 
funds to rescue Bank Century (renamed Bank of Mutiara and later became J-Trust 
Bank). The recent financial crisis revealed that micro-prudential regulatory framework 
is not enough to prevent contagion across the world as a result of bank failures that 
began in the United States and later in Europe and other parts of the world, including 
in Indonesia. 
  
 
http://journal.uinjkt.ac.id/index.php/signifikan  303 
DOI:  10.15408/sjie.v6i2.5296 
 Signifikan Vol. 6 (2), October 2017 
Micro-prudential regulatory framework is based on the provisions of Basel I and 
II agreements, which impose minimum capital requirement (Capital Adequacy 
Ratio/CAR) as a preventive measure against unexpected losses (Pillar I). Drakos and 
Kouretas (2014) revealed that the Basel II agreements led to the development of 
internal systems for measuring market risk and regulation as viewed soundness of 
individual financial institutions. However, these provisions only based on capital 
adequacy ignore factors such as size, level of leverage, and the relationship with the 
entire system. Arnold et.al. (2012) found the key aspects of the new regulatory 
reforms through the Basel III agreement, including measurement and regulate systemic 
risk, as well as designing and implementing macro-prudential policies in a proper way. 
Basel III agreement is still in formation is expected to address most of the problems 
associated with systemic risk and developing an appropriate framework for regulation 
and supervision of financial markets. For central banks and financial regulators, this is a 
great value to be able to measure the risks that could threaten the financial system, 
not only at national level but also globally. Given the magnitude of losses incurred as a 
result of a systemic crisis, this study measures the level of systemic risk in the financial 
system in Indonesia, with a focus on banking institutions. 
Assessing the level of systemic risk has gotten a lot of attention after the US 
financial crisis in 2007-2008. The main points of the issue of systemic risk is that the 
bank is experiencing distress will create panic in the financial system during periods of 
distress, causing the failure of other institutions and lead to the financial crisis. The 
most common measurement tool used by financial institutions in measuring the risk is 
value-at-risk (VaR), which was introduced by Jorion (2006). VaR is used to calculate 
possible losses of financial institutions within a certain confidence level. The problem 
that arises is that VaR does not consider the institution as part of a system that may be 
able to experience instability and spreading economic risks. Furthermore, it is known 
that the assessment focuses on information bank balance sheets, including the ratio of 
non-performing loan (NPL), earnings and profitability, liquidity and size of capital 
adequacy is not appropriate to evaluate the health of the financial system (Huang, et.al, 
2009; Benoit, et.al, 2013). 
Systemic risk contained in any system that is built by the components interacts 
with each other. A systemic risk said to be due to such risks arising from the 
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interaction of the unpredictability of the various components of the system. Systemic 
risk is known very widely, not only in the financial sector, but also in the medical field. 
Illustrations of these risks such as disease epidemics, i.e. an infectious disease outbreak 
quickly over a large area and caused many casualties. Systemic risk is a peculiarity of 
the financial system. Systemic crises can cause great harm in the real sector and the 
welfare state as a whole. 
De-Bandt and Hartmann (2000) define a systemic event in the narrow sense as 
an event in which the emergence of "bad news" about the failures and the collapse of 
financial institutions, which have an impact on one or several other financial 
institutions. Systemic risk is expressed as a possibility if an institution experiencing 
distress, this can lead to other institutions in the banking industry into distress that can 
lead to bank runs and banking collapse of the financial system (Adrian and 
Brunnermeier, 2011). The systemic risk is the risk of joint failure arising from the 
relationship between return on assets from the bank's balance sheet (Acharya, et.al, 
2010), 
The definition of systemic risk from the G-10 Statement on Financial Sector 
Consolidation in 2001 was the risk of an event that would trigger a loss of economic 
value or confidence, and increased uncertainty of the financial system are serious 
enough and have a significant negative effect on the real economy. Systemic risk events 
may occur suddenly and unexpectedly. Impact of systemic problems such as the 
payment system disorders, impaired credit flows, and declining asset values will hurt 
the real economy. 
Two related assumptions underlying the definition of systemic risk. First, 
economic shocks can become systemic because of their negative externalities 
associated with disturbances in the financial system. Second, systemic events are very 
likely to cause unwanted effects, such as a substantial reduction in output and 
employment, in the absence of appropriate policy responses. In this definition, the 
financial disturbance that does not have a high probability and does not cause 
significant interruption of real economic activity is not a systemic risk event. 
In the G-10 report in 2001 stated after systemic events, the estimated effects 
are potentially event on the real economy in general. First, the payment system 
becomes compromised, including bank run that could cause the failure of liquidity. 
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Second, the current disruption of credit can make a reduction in the provision of funds. 
This activity is to finance profitable investment opportunities in the non-financial 
sector. Third, the collapse of asset prices, may be caused by a drastic reduction in the 
money supply aggregates caused by a bank run or a general decline in the liquidity of 
financial markets, could lead to financial failure as well as companies non-financial, and 
reduce economic activity through a reduction in wealth and increased uncertainty. 
There are two an important element of the definition of systemic risk 
presented by De-Bandt and Hartmann (2000), which shocks and propagation 
mechanisms. A shock can be idiosyncratic or systematic. In the context of the extreme 
is idiosyncratic shocks initially only affects the health of a single financial institution or 
just a single asset prices, be systematic in the extreme that affect the entire economy, 
affecting all financial institutions at the same time. Shocks systematic national financial 
system can be fluctuations in general business cycle or a sudden increase in inflation. 
Crash capital markets that act as shock systematic in the majority of financial 
institutions normally have no effect uniformly. The same applies also to the lack of 
liquidity in financial markets, which may be associated with a crash or some other 
event that causes doubts on the financial health of ordinary traded in the financial 
markets (De-Bandt and Hartmann, 2000). 
The second key element in a systemic event in the narrow sense is a 
mechanism that shocks propagate from one financial institution to another financial 
institution. This is the essence of the concept of systemic risk. The spread of shocks in 
the financial system that work through physical exposure or effect information 
(including the potential loss of trust) cannot be considered simple. From the 
conceptual point of view, the transmission of shocks is a natural part of the adjustment 
to stabilize the market system to establish a new equilibrium. Regarding the type of 
systemic activity caused simultaneously by surprise systematic mechanisms that lead to 
default or crashes may often involve the propagation of macroeconomic includes 
interactions between real and financial variables. For example, a cyclical downturn may 
trigger a wave of corporate failures, not only increases the non-performing loans in the 
bank, but also to encourage banks to reduce lending further (Gorton, 1988). 
Previous literature regarding systemic risk measurement using high frequency 
time-series data, the use of credit default swaps (CDS). Segoviano and Goodhart 
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(2009) argue that the CDS is a good estimator to measure systemic risk. The 
downside of this approach is that the CDS only captures credit risk and for market 
risk. Basically, this approach provides a framework for evaluating the dependence of 
financial institutions on a particular system in the event of distress.  
Systemic risk studies using cross-sectional designed by Acharya et al. (2010) 
aims to introduce a systemic risk size measurements using a technique systemic 
expected shortfall (SES) and the marginal expected shortfall (MES). MES and SES 
calculation are based on the daily equity returns. These studies provide sufficient 
evidence on the high predictive power in forecasting SES, which is calculated through 
the MES and leverage. Acharya et al. (2010) defines the expected shortfall as a systemic 
tendency of financial institutions to be undercapitalized when the system overall capital 
shortfall. 
Analysis using CoVaR as methodologies for measuring systemic risk introduced 
by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) with a study entitled "CoVaR" in which the author 
defines the nature and features CoVaR and ΔCoVaR in estimating systemic risk. This 
size is based on the concept of value-at-risk (VaR), is expressed by VaR (α), which is 
the maximum loss in α% confidence interval. In addition, the study also estimates the 
extent of determining factors such as leverage, size, and maturity mismatch in 
predicting systemic risk contribution. Output forecasting results of samples tested 
proved to be valid. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defines systemic risk has two 
important components, namely first systemic risk is built-up during the credit boom 
when environmentally low risk assumed and can be labeled as 'volatility paradox' and 
the second component of systemic risk to the spillover effect that intensifies initial 
adverse shocks in times of crisis. This study outlines the spillover effects of direct and 
indirect and is based on the correlation tail variations between financial institutions and 
the financial system. 
The results achieved by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) shows that the VaR of 
an institution and its contribution to systemic risk as measured by ΔCoVaR have a link 
that is intangible. Justification separate regulatory action based on the risk of the 
institution may not hamper the financial sector from systemic risk. VaR and ΔCoVaR 
have a weak relationship. Furthermore, the output of research Adrian and 
Brunnermeier (2011) show that companies with leverage and maturity mismatch 
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higher, as well as the larger size gives the highest contribution to systemic risk, both at 
the level of 1% and 5%. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proved to be a technique that 
adds to the systemic risk alternative methods designed to estimate the risk 
contribution system with individual financial institutions. This approach is the right way 
is used to shorten the application of macro-prudential policy. 
In the model used CoVaR state variable, which is the macro variables that only 
serves to make time-varying VaR and CoVaR. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) build a 
common unconditional ΔCoVaR that is constant over time. ΔCoVaR conditional 
models as a function of the state variables will make constant model into time series. 
The state variables used in this study include equity returns are returns Composite 
Stock Price Index, historical volatility is the volatility of Composite Stock Price Index, 
and real estate returns are returns from stock price index, housing or property. 
This study used a sample of 9 largest banks by assets as assets on the banks 
controlled 59.48%, or more than half of total banking assets in Indonesia. Indicator-
based approach has been proposed as a means of indirectly measuring systemic risk 
using indicators that are believed to be associated with the systemic risk or systemic 
interests. Pais and Stork (2013) showed that large banks tend to have high levels of 
value-at-risk (VaR) is a little taller and found that banks with huge assets have 
significant systemic risk is higher. Analysis of Huang, et.al (2011) showed that the 
marginal contribution of each bank's systemic risk indicator is determined largely by 
the size of the bank. Systemic risk contribution of each bank to the banking system is 
defined as a marginal contribution to systemic risk of the banking system as a whole. 
Ayomi and Hermanto (2013) also found that the bank's biggest asset has huge systemic 
risk contribution. In other words, the size of the bank will proportionally with the 
systemic risk contribution. But Zhou (2010) has a different opinion, stating that the 
systemic impact of a bank failure does not correlate with the size. Gravelle and Li 
(2013) also concluded the same thing, that the size of a financial institution not dictates 
how systemic institutions. 
In accordance with the problems posed in the research, the purpose of this 
study was to estimate the individual risk of each bank based on an analysis of value-at-
risk (VaR), to estimate the contribution of each bank to the risk of systemic whole in 
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the banking sector in Indonesia based on the analysis marginal conditional value-at-risk 
(ΔCoVaR), and to estimate the correlation between VaR and ΔCoVaR each bank. 
 
METHOD 
Data 
The data used is the financial data on 9 banks are used as samples, the period of 
January 2005 to December 2014, as well as stock market data that is used in the 
variable state. Source of data used comes from Bank Indonesia, Indonesian Capital 
Market Directory (ICMD), Indonesia Stock Exchange, Bloomberg, and Yahoo! Finance. 
Measurement Method 
Value-at-Risk 
Value-at-risk (VaR), which is created and developed by JP Morgan risk metrics 
have been widely used as a tool for measuring risk in financial markets. The theory 
behind the VaR lies in estimating the maximum value is lost on the asset or liability is 
given for a specific time period within a certain confidence level. However, much of the 
literature is currently challenging VaR as a tool to measure risk. Wong and Fong (2010) 
stated VaR focused on assets in isolation, because of the real risk of the assets 
considered less attention, especially when other assets are distress conditions. In 
addition, Dowd and Blake (2006) emphasizes that the signal VaR is only a maximum 
loss when the tail did not happen, but it did not warn about the losses that may occur. 
It shows that only rely on VaR is not the right method to measure systemic risk. 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defines VaR as a quantile θ conditional on 
assets  or can be denoted as follows: 
 
There is three basic methods in calculating the value-at-risk presented by Dowd 
and Blake (2006), namely: parametric methods; nonparametric methods (historical 
simulation); and Monte Carlo simulation method. Parametric methods supported by 
distribution assumptions. However, the distribution assumption leads to the risk of 
error specification, so that selective distribution should be very accurate which is 
rather difficult to achieve in the study (Dowd and Blake, 2006). 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) defined an institution VaRj (or the 
financial system) conditional to some event in the institutioni. This size is based 
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on the concept of value-at-risk, expressed by , which is the maximum loss in θ% 
confidence interval. Then CoVaR corresponded with market returns VaR obtained 
conditionally on multiple events observed from institutionsi.  defined by 
all θ quantile of the conditional probability distributions: 
 
So that contribute institution i to institution j (or the financial system) can be denoted 
as follows: 
 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) focus on the conditioning events  
and simplify the notation , where j = system, that is, when the return of a 
portfolio of  all  financial  institutions  in  its  VaR  level.  In  this  case,  the  superscript 
j is eliminated, thus  shows  the  difference   between   the   financial   system 
conditional  VaR  of  financial   institutions   i   experiencing   distress   and   financial 
system   conditional   VaR   against   the   institution   i   on   the   condition   of   the 
median. 
Contemporary  size quantifies the spillover effect by measuring how 
many institutions that contribute donate overall risk in the financial system. Spillover 
effects can be directly transmitted through contractual link between financial 
institutions. From the definition CoVaR by Adrian and Brunnermeier shows that 
financial institutions are experiencing distress that coincides with the financial system is 
also experiencing distress will have a measure of systemic risk is high. This approach is 
one of the statistical approaches, without explicitly referring to structural economic 
model. 
After the return of assets is calculated, from the bank's VaR and VaR system i 
can be defined. If  is the return of bank i and has distribution F, then given the 
confidence level (1-θ), then can be defined as follows: 
 
VaR is basically θ of F distribution quantile returns. Specifically, VaR with a confidence 
level θ is defined by the following equation: 
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Means there is a possibility (100 x θ)% return is smaller than the VaR for a certain 
period or in other words, with a confidence level (1-θ), the return will not be smaller 
than the VaR. After that, it can calculate the VaR of the banking system as a standard 
VaR unconditionally, 
 
or conditional VaR in the event that certain banks are under pressure (stress), i.e. the 
return of the bank reached its VaR level, which can be called a conditional VaR 
(CoVaR). 
 
Estimation Method 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) proposed a way that is relatively easy to 
calculate and interpret statistical measures of systemic risk in real time. The first point 
is to determine the market value of the assets of a bank. Roengpitya and 
Rungcharoenkitkul (2011) defines the market value of assets is market capitalization 
multiplied by the leverage ratio. Market capitalization is the total number of securities 
issued by companies in the market. While the leverage ratio in this case is the ratio of 
bank assets to the bank's equity. The market value of assets (A) can be denoted as 
follows: 
 
where A is the market value of assets, M is the market capitalization, and L is the 
leverage ratio (assets to equity). To measure the return of the assets of a bank i  is 
used the following equation: 
 
 
 
To measure the system asset returns  denoted as follows: 
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where 
 
The state variables used to estimate the variance of time of VaR and CoVaR 
where the state variables can capture moments conditional variance time on asset 
returns. The state variables are not interpreted as a risk factor, but as conditioning 
variables that shift the conditional mean and conditional volatility on the measurement 
of risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011). VaR and CoVaR with a subscript 
t  shows the variance (time-varying) on VaR and CoVaR. So as to 
estimate  and  (in the form of the variance of the time), required state 
variables . In running regressions with monthly data, obtained by the following 
equation: 
 
 
The state variables in this study include equity returns (EQRt), historical volatility 
(VLTt), and real estate returns (PROPt). To estimate VaR and CoVaR there are several 
stages of the calculation. First, estimate the conditional quantile regression analysis of 
state variables: 
 
so that the equation (13) become equation (15): 
    (15) 
and equation (14) becomes equation (16): 
     (16) 
where 
 : assets return bank i, periodt, quantile θ 
 : assets return system, periodt, quantile θ 
 : equity return, periodt 
 : historical volatility, periodt 
 : real estate return, periodt 
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Second, estimate the time-varying VaR and CoVaR using coefficients , , dan  
resulting from quantile regression analysis: 
 
 
where, 
 
Third, estimate the contribution  individual institutions against systemic 
risk overall. The level of contributions is denoted as follows: 
 
 
 
RESULT AND DISCUSSION 
Estimated value-at-risk (VaR) of each bank using the coefficient generated from 
quantile regression of 5% and median VaR represents the tail probability of maximum 
loss of 5% and median. The estimation results of Value-at-Risk (VaR) on average during 
the critical condition (0.05 quantile) during the observation period showed that Bank I 
has  the  highest  VaR  value,  which  amounted  to  14.56%,  while  the  lowest   VaR 
at Bank C, amounting 8.32%. The value of VaR at Bank I amounted to 14.56%. This 
means  that  there  is  a  5%  possibility  that   investors  will  lose  more   than   
14.56% of the portfolio value if investors choose Bank I as part of the portfolio. 
Interpretation   from   another   point   of   view   is   the investor Bank I has a 95% 
chance  that  their  losses   will   not   exceed   14.56% of  the  portfolio.  The   value  
of   VaR   on Bank C of 8.32%. This means that there is a 5% possibility that investors 
will  lose  more   than   8.32%   of   the   value   of   the   portfolio   if investors 
choose Bank C as part of the portfolio. Interpretation from another point of view is 
the investor Bank C has a 95% chance that their losses will not exceed 8.32% of the 
portfolio. 
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Table 1. Value-at-Risk 5% and Median 
Banks VaR 5% VaR Median 
Bank A -0,105811 0,019053 
Bank B -0,094110 0,017705 
Bank C -0,083150 0,008829 
Bank D -0,143496 0,012318 
Bank E -0,135702 0,007651 
Bank F -0,125019 0,010321 
Bank G -0,107502 0,004644 
Bank H -0,126027 0,016324 
Bank I -0,145639 -0,005835 
CoVaR measured using quantile regression coefficients obtained from Return 
on Assets System conditional on each return bank and economic factors (state 
variables). Estimation of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) of each bank using the 
coefficient generated from quantile regression of 5% and 50% (median) represents 
CoVaR at 5% and median.Estimates of conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) of each bank 
using the coefficient generated from quantile regression of 5% and a median 
representing CoVaR the tail probability of maximum loss of 5% and median. 
Table 2. Conditional Value-at-Risk 5% and Median 
Banks CoVaR 5% CoVaR Median 
Bank A -0,067474 0,009361 
Bank B -0,060764 0,012349 
Bank C -0,051573 0,009991 
Bank D -0,070341 0,013295 
Bank E -0,053716 0,015109 
Bank F -0,062614 0,014264 
Bank G -0,054234 0,016360 
Bank H -0,072669 0,013258 
Bank I -0,050776 0,013417 
The estimation results of Conditional Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) average at the 
time of critical conditions (quantile 0.05) during the observation period showed that 
Bank H has the highest CoVaR value, which amounted to 7.27%, while the lowest 
CoVaR on Bank I, ie by 5.08%.The value of the conditional VaR system, amounting to 
7.27% when Bank H in a state of distress. That is the state of distress in Bank H will 
give effect to the system that impact the system will suffer a loss of 7.27%.The value of 
the conditional VaR system, amounting to 5.08% when Bank I in a state of distress. 
That is the state of distress in Bank I would give effect to the system that impact the 
system will suffer a loss of 5.08%. 
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Table 3. Marginal CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) 
Banks ΔCoVaR 
Bank A -0,076836 
Bank B -0,073113 
Bank C -0,061565 
Bank D -0,083636 
Bank E -0,068825 
Bank F -0,076878 
Bank G -0,070594 
Bank H -0,085927 
Bank I -0,064194 
Marginal CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) represents the difference CoVaR at the time of 
distress and CoVaR condition when the condition of the median. The estimation 
results of marginal Conditional Value-at-Risk (ΔCoVaR) average over the study period 
showed that Bank H has the highest ΔCoVaR value, which amounted to 8.59%, while 
the lowest ΔCoVaR at Bank C, amounting to 6.16%.Value marginal CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) 
Bank H is 8.59% which means that PNBN contribute 8.59% of systemic risk in the 
system when migrating from the median VaR to the extreme, in this case VaR 5%. The 
value of the marginal CoVaR (ΔCoVaR) BBCA amounted to 6.16% which means that 
Bank C contribute 6.16% of systemic risk in the system when migrating from the 
median VaR to the extreme, in this case VaR 5%. 
Testing individual correlation aims to determine whether there is a correlation 
between the value-at-risk (VaR) and marginal conditional value-at-risk (ΔCoVaR). 
Testing tools using Spearman correlation test and Kendall's Tau. The results of testing 
the correlation of each bank can be seen at Table 4. The correlation coefficient 
between VaR and ΔCoVaR calculated using Spearman correlation and correlation 
Kendall's Tau as has been shown in the research methodology. From the test results 
that the resulting correlation VaRand ΔCoVaR at Bank A, Bank E, Bank F, and Bank G 
showed no significant results. While the correlation of test results in Bank B, Bank C, 
Bank D, Bank H, and Bank I show significant results. 
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Table 4. Spearman and Kendall's Tau Correlation on Individual Bank 
Banks 
Spearman Kendall’s Tau 
Ρ Prob. τ Prob. 
Bank A 0,166838 0,0686 0,114566 0,0639 
Bank B -0,369922 0,0000 -0,259664 0,0000 
Bank C -0,206695 0,0235 -0,145938 0,0182 
Bank D -0,658740 0,0000 -0,489356 0,0000 
Bank E -0,001118 0,9903 0,003081 0,9620 
Bank F 0,035877 0,6973 0,028011 0,6517 
Bank G -0,040142 0,6633 -0,020168 0,7457 
Bank H -0,265574 0,0034 -0,181513 0,0033 
Bank I 0,479790 0,0000 0,340616 0,0000 
The results of the calculations get that at Bank A, VaR has a positive correlation 
to ΔCoVaR. The magnitude of the correlation value against VaR to ΔCoVaR in Bank A 
can be seen from the value of ρ (rho) is 0.166838 and the value of τ (tau) is 0.114566. 
VaR of Bank E has a negative and positive correlation on ΔCoVaR with the value of ρ 
(rho) is -0.001118 and the value of τ (tau) is 0.003081. VaR of Bank F has a positive 
correlation on ΔCoVaR with the value of ρ (rho) is 0.035877 and the value of τ (tau) is 
0.028011. And VaR of Bank G has a negative correlation onΔCoVaR with the value of 
ρ (rho) is -0.040142 and the value of τ (tau) is -0.020168. 
In a scatter plot in Figure 1 shows the uneven distribution between individual 
risk (VaR) on the X axis and systemic risk contribution (ΔCoVaR) on the Y axis for 
each bank scatter plot shows a very weak relationship between VaR and ΔCoVaR. It 
can be concluded that to see the systemic risk contribution of each bank cannot rely 
solely on the size of VaR. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Results of research on systemic risk and ΔCoVaR shows VaR for each bank 
portion has a weak correlation and others do not have a significant correlation or in 
other words, almost no correlation. The results of the correlation calculations are 
under 0.50.At the end of 2008 the polemics in Indonesia when the Financial Stability 
Committee poured huge funds to save Bank Century. At that time the Bank Century 
was declared by the government as the bank failed to systemic risk. The complexity of 
defining the risk of systemic causes of this case became controversial. 
The magnitude of the risk of individual banks does not mean proportional to 
the bank's contribution to systemic risk banks. In this study, Bank I has greater 
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individual risk among other banks, which amounted to 14.56%, while the contribution 
of the greatest systemic risk to the banking system is in Bank H, which amounted to 
8.59%. Bank with value-at-risk (VaR) is high does not automatically become a bank 
which contribute greatly to the systemic risk in the banking system. So that needs to 
be done on the calculation method in addition to the value-at-risk (VaR) to assess the 
magnitude of systemic risk, one of them using a conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR). 
In estimating the contribution of banks against systemic risk is not enough to 
look at the total assets of the bank. In this study, Bank H is a bank with the largest risk 
contribution (8.59%) had total assets eighth largest in Indonesia. In a state of crisis in 
the banking system, regulators would not only save the banks with total assets of large, 
but also the bank has total assets of small for the size is not the main reference for the 
contribution of banks to systemic risk. The failure of the banks that have small assets 
would trigger a rush to the bank to other banks the same level so that it can add to 
the uncertainty on the domestic market, which is fatal for the economy. 
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Figure 1. Scatter Plot between VaR and ΔCoVaR each Banks 
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